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One popular conception of natural theology holds that certain purely rational 
arguments are insulated from empirical inquiry and independently establish 
conclusions that provide evidence, justification, or proof of God’s existence. Yet, 
some raise suspicions that philosophers and theologians’ personal religious beliefs 
inappropriately affect these kinds of arguments. I present an experimental test of 
whether philosophers and theologians’ argument analysis is influenced by 
religious commitments. The empirical findings suggest religious belief affects 
philosophical analysis and offer a challenge to theists and atheists, alike: 
reevaluate the scope of natural theology’s conclusions or acknowledge and begin 
to address the influence of religious belief. 
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1. Religious Belief and Philosophical Argument 
 Reason is fundamental to many projects of natural theology.1 I use ‘natural theology’ as a 
rough label for the branch of theology and philosophy of religion on which I focus here. I follow 
a narrow definition, upon which projects in ‘natural theology’ are those presenting rational 
arguments for the existence of God (De Cruz, 2014). 
Importantly, many interpret natural theological arguments as having real epistemic 
weight (Braine, 1988; Miller, 1991; Swinburne, 2004). There are other possible interpretations of 
these arguments. For instance, we might use them as methods of understanding God rather than 
as ones providing independent epistemic support (Sudduth, 2009). But this kind of use is not my 
immediate focus.2 Instead, my targets are those philosophical or theological projects taking 
certain natural theological arguments to provide evidence, justification, or proof of God’s 
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existence (see Moore, 2010). 
Many of these target approaches situate natural theological arguments in the domain of 
purely a priori, analytic, or conceptual reason, holding that no empirical evidence bears on these 
arguments. On this view, whether or not (e.g.) an ontological argument for the existence of God 
is successful certainly does not depend on empirical investigation. For such projects, rational 
argument is sufficient to establish conclusions about the nature and existence of God and is 
insulated from empirical inquiry. 
But there is a notable phenomenon in philosophy of religion that suggests an empirical 
challenge to these rationalist projects. In comparison to the rest of the philosophical profession, 
there is an overrepresentation of theistic philosophers of religion (Chalmers and Bourget, 2014; 
De Cruz, 2013). In fact, of all specialization and philosophical view correlations in Chalmers and 
Bourget’s large (2014) study of philosophical views, the greatest is between specializing in 
philosophy of religion and endorsing theism. 
To some, this raises suspicion that natural theological arguments are subject to a 
pernicious influence of religious belief. That proponents of one side of a philosophical debate 
largely constitute the field might suggest that their personal beliefs are inappropriately shaping 
argument analyses. But that there is an overrepresentation of theists in the philosophy of religion 
need not be problematic; (e.g.) the correlation between specializing in philosophy of religion and 
endorsing theism might instead be explained by the convincing nature of theism. There is no 
good reason based solely on the overabundance of theists in the field to think religious belief 
problematically influences philosophical argument. 
Importantly, resolving this issue requires answering an empirical question; do religious 
beliefs affect philosophical analyses of presumably empirically-insulated arguments? Those who 
	
defend these arguments hold that religious beliefs do not and should not affect them. 
Identification as a theist or atheist should not affect one’s ability to judge a particular 
philosophical argument’s strength or logical validity. In the same way, identification as a 
consequentialist or deontologist should not affect one’s ability to judge a particular ethical 
arguments’ strength or logical validity.3 
De Cruz’s (2013) ‘Cognitive Science of Religion and the Study of Theological Concepts’ 
provides some compelling empirical evidence that religious commitments influence certain types 
of philosophical belief. Philosophers of religion and theologians were asked to rate arguments for 
theism (e.g. ‘the argument from beauty’) and arguments for atheism (e.g. ‘the argument from 
evil’) on a scale from ‘very weak’ to ‘very strong.’ De Cruz found that theists rated arguments 
for theism more strongly than did atheists, while atheists rated arguments for atheism more 
strongly than did theists. 
This is a fascinating empirical finding, but it is not necessarily troubling for natural 
theology. Theists, well versed in theistic argument, might recall the best version of an argument 
for theism (e.g. the most compelling version of the ‘cosmological argument’); atheists, on the 
other hand, might recall the best version of an argument for atheism (e.g. the most compelling 
‘argument from divine hiddenness’). Participants were not provided with an explicit argument, 
but rather with a generic argument title. One plausible interpretation of the data is simply that 
when asked to rate an argument for theism titled the argument of ‘x,’ theists recalled better 
versions and atheists worse ones; and when asked to rate an argument for atheism titled the 
argument of ‘y,’ theists recalled worse versions and atheists better ones. 
To empirically test whether personal religious commitments affect philosophical analysis 																																																								
3 Put another way, even a committed consequentialist should be able to recognize a strong, weak, valid, or invalid 
argument, whether this argument results in consequentialist or non-consequentialist conclusions.  
	
of natural theological arguments, philosopher and theologian experimental participants should be 
provided with an explicit argument. What would provide an even more convincing test would be 
the presentation of two arguments of equal quality, one establishing a theistic conclusion and 
another establishing an atheistic conclusion. In this case, defenders of a purely a priori, analytic, 
conceptual method in natural theology would hope that there is no effect of religious belief on 
argument analysis; trained philosophers and theologians (atheistic or theistic) should recognize 
the quality of equivalently strong arguments independently of the arguments’ (atheistic or 
theistic) conclusions. 
I will shortly present an experimental study providing such an empirical test. For a basis 
of constructing two such comparable arguments, I turn next to an introduction of the modal 
ontological argument. This argument can be formulated in two extremely similar ways, but with 
radically different conclusions: one establishing the existence of God, and the other establishing 
the non-existence of God. This provides an ideal test case for empirical inquiry; if personal 
religious beliefs do not affect analysis of purely a priori, analytic, conceptual arguments, we 
should expect philosophers and theologians to evaluate comparable modal ontological arguments 
equivalently, whether the argument concludes in God’s existence or non-existence. 
 
2. The Modal Ontological Argument 
 Ontological arguments for God’s existence abound in theology and philosophy of 
religion, from Anselm to Gödel (Charlesworth, 1965; Sobel, 1987). Despite variance among 
ontological arguments for God’s existence, an often-cited unifying feature is their analytic, a 
priori method (Oppy, 1995). On this view, ontological arguments for God’s existence are those 
that seek to establish conclusions about God’s existence from reason alone, without the need for 
	
a posteriori or empirical inquiry. This makes them a suitable target for the present investigation; 
an ontological argument is one that should be insulated from contingent or irrelevant empirical 
facts, including facts about the person considering or evaluating the argument. 
 One of the best-known recent arguments is Plantinga’s (1974) modal ontological 
argument. Plantinga defines a being as having ‘maximal excellence’ if (and only if) it is 
omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect. A being has ‘maximal greatness’ if (and only if) it 
has maximal excellence necessarily (in every possible world). From the claim that it is possible 
(or, there is a possible world in which) a being has maximal greatness and the relevant modal 
assumptions, we deduce that there is a being with maximal greatness. 
 But as some have noticed, this style of argument can be applied to construct an argument 
for the non-existence of a being with maximal greatness (Oppy, 2011). From the claim that it is 
possible that no being has maximal greatness, we deduce (on the relevant modal assumptions) 
that there is no being with maximal greatness. This argument closely mirrors the standard modal 
ontological argument in form, but arrives at the opposite conclusion.  
 
3. An Experiment 
I conducted one experiment to investigate how philosophers and theologians holding 
various religious beliefs evaluate two versions of the modal ontological argument. Participants 
were recruited in June 2013 through an online blog, the Prosblogion, widely read by 
philosophers of religion and theologians. All participants received the same three survey 
components, in varied orders. The components were an evaluation of a modal ontological 
argument for God’s existence, an evaluation of a modal ontological argument for God’s 
nonexistence, and a demographical questionnaire. The arguments were not ones explicitly for or 
	
against ‘God’s existence,’ but rather for or against the existence of ‘a being with maximal 
greatness.’ Here I will refer to a being with maximal greatness as ‘God’ for convenience. 
Participants received two arguments, one for the existence of God and one against the 
existence of God, in counterbalanced, randomized order. The ‘for’ argument was presented as 
follows: 
Consider the argument below and answer the following questions. 
 
Argument: 
1. (Assumption) That which is possibly necessary is necessary. 
2. (Definition) A being has maximal greatness if and only if, necessarily, it exists and is 
omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good.  
3. (Premise) It is possible that there is a being with maximal greatness. 
4. Therefore, necessarily, there exists a being with maximal greatness. 
5. Therefore, there exists a being with maximal greatness. 
 
The ‘against’ argument was similar, replacing 3-5 above with: 
 
3. (Premise) It is possible that there is not a being with maximal greatness. 
4. Therefore, necessarily, there does not exist a being with maximal greatness. 
5. Therefore, there does not exist a being with maximal greatness. 
 
After reading each argument, participants answered a number of questions. First they 
were asked about the validity of the argument presented: ‘Is the above argument valid (does the 
conclusion follow logically from the assumption, definitions, and premise)?’ They were also 
asked about the strength of the argument: ‘How strong do you find the above argument?’ (on a 
scale from 1 to 10).4 Participants were also asked for their religious beliefs: whether they 
identified religiously as a Theist, Agnostic, or Atheist.  
Participants failing a comprehension check question (‘What is the conclusion of the 
above argument?’) were excluded from analyses. There was no effect of order of presentation of 
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the arguments or of the demographics on strength and validity ratings of either the ‘for’ or 
‘against’ argument.  
64 participants (98% male) completed the survey. All participants in the analysis had an 
educational background in a relevant field (philosophy or theology) and over 70% had completed 
a masters degree or higher in a relevant field. 68% of participants identified as Theists, 16% as 
Agnostics, and 16% as Atheists. The main analyses conducted involved determining whether 
religious identification affected the argument validity and strength ratings.  
For each group (Atheists, Agnostics, Theists), I compared the number of participants 
rating each argument (‘for’ or ‘against’) as valid. For Theists, 88% rated the ‘for’ argument as 
valid, while 65% rated the ‘against’ argument as valid.5 Among non-Theists there was no 
significant difference in argument ratings.6 Because there were more Theistic participants than 
Atheistic or Agnostic ones, these differences may be explained in part by an underpowered 
analysis of these latter groups. Yet, the difference in validity ratings between arguments (‘for’ 
and ‘against’) was smaller for agnostics (10% difference) and atheists (10% difference) than 
theists (23% difference). 
To assess the effect of religious belief (or disbelief) on argument strength ratings, I used 
religious identification (Atheist, Agnostic, Theist) as condition and the difference in argument 
strength score ratings as the dependent measure. This ‘argument strength rating difference’ score 
was calculated by subtracting a participants’ strength rating for the ‘against’ argument from his 
strength rating for the ‘for’ argument. For instance, someone rating the ‘for’ argument as 7 on the 
strength scale and the ‘against’ argument as 10 on the strength scale would have a difference in 
strength ratings score of -3. Religious belief identification affected difference in strength ratings, 																																																								
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see Figure 1 below.7 
 
Figure 1. ‘For’ strength score minus ‘Against’ strength score, by reported religious affiliation  
 
Atheist identifiers had overall negative ratings, indicating they gave greater strength ratings for 
the ‘against’ argument than for the ‘for’ argument. Theist identifiers demonstrated the opposite 
pattern. Agnostic ratings fell between those of these two groups.8 
Looking closer for effects of religious belief on the ‘for’ and ‘against’ arguments 
revealed a main effect of religious belief on strength scores for the ‘for’ argument.9 Intriguingly, 
there was no significant effect of religious belief on strength scores for the ‘against’ argument.10 
 These results indicate that there was an effect of religious belief on analysis of the 
philosophical arguments. Theists (but not atheists or agnostics) saw a modal ontological 
argument as logically valid more often when it established God’s existence compared to when it 
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established God’s non-existence. There was a main effect of religious belief on the perceived 
strength of the modal ontological argument; atheists rated the ‘against’ argument as stronger than 
the ‘for’; agnostics rated the arguments roughly equivalently; and theists rated the ‘for’ argument 
as stronger than the ‘against.’ 
Some might worry that this effect is driven by particular demographic features of the 
participant pool. For instance, one might contend that (e.g.) philosophers of religion are better 
suited to evaluate the modal ontological argument than (e.g.) epistemologists.11 In anticipation of 
this concern, I asked participants to identity (i) their level of educational background and (ii) any 
areas of professional specialization. Since participants were recruited from an online philosophy 
and theology blog, their backgrounds were representative of a broad array of academic fields. 
 The effect of religious affiliation on strength difference ratings remained significant when 
controlling for educational background (e.g. “4-year College Degree,” “Masters Degree,” 
“Doctoral Degree”).12 The effect of religious affiliation remained significant when controlling 
for specialization categories (metaphysics, epistemology, language, mind, logic, philosophy of 
religion, ethics, political philosophy, legal philosophy, history of philosophy, philosophy of 
science, philosophy of mathematics, theology, and religious studies).13 It might be of particular 
interest to readers to note that none of the seemingly most plausible candidate specializations 
(theology, religious studies, philosophy of religion) significantly affected strength difference 
ratings.14 This suggests the found effect of religious identification is not confined to one 
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subgroup of specialists; it also seems no group of specialists is particularly immune.15 
 
4. The Robustness of the Empirical Results and Challenge 
 The most important potential objection to address is one claiming that the ‘for’ and 
‘against’ arguments are not comparable. This objection could take a number of specific forms, 
but generally these are varieties of a line of objection that the ‘for’ and ‘against’ versions of the 
modal ontological argument presented are not equally strong or valid. 
 One reason that such objections are tempting is that any argument requires interpretation. 
Admittedly, there are many possible subtle variations of interpretation of the modal ontological 
arguments presented here. However, on the most plausible interpretations the arguments are of 
equivalent quality. 
It might help to interpret the arguments in terms of possible worlds (Lewis, 1986). 
Imagine there are possible worlds W1, W2 ... Wn and ours is W1. From W1, that it is possible 
there is a being with maximal greatness (e.g. in W2) implies that necessarily, a being exists and is 
omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good. In other words, in W1, W2, ... Wn this being exists. 
Therefore, there exists a being (in W1) with maximal greatness. For the opposing argument, we 
start by assuming it is possible there is no being with maximal greatness. For instance, if (from 
W1) it is possible that in W2 there is no being with maximal greatness, there is necessarily no 
being with maximal greatness in any world since maximal greatness requires existence in every 
possible world. Thus, there is no being with maximal greatness in our world. 
 There might yet be other interpretations of the arguments. But to ground an objection, 
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one must not merely posit a novel interpretation. One must also defend the existence of a 
plausible interpretation of the ‘for’ and ‘against’ arguments such that one is stronger than the 
other and only one is valid. Such interpretations may be possible, but grounding a successful 
objection also requires defending such an interpretation as a plausible alternative, one that the 
experimental participants were likely to employ.  
Following the logic of such putative objections reveals their obscurity; is it really 
plausible that theists endorse a logic which validates only the ‘for’ argument while atheists 
tend to endorse a logic validating the ‘against’ argument? Such objections have the flavor of 
post-hoc rationalization. When considering whether the empirical results are likely explained by 
the hypothesized effect of religious belief or (e.g.) an interaction of religious belief and the 
endorsement of particular axioms and inference rules of modal logic such that the ‘against’ 
argument is more often valid and strong for atheists and the ‘for’ argument is more often valid 
and strong for theists, one must admit the former abductive inference is much more plausible. 
 There are a number of other possible ‘objections’ one might raise. For instance, ‘the 
experimental material does not distinguish between metaphysical and epistemic possibility!’ But 
this does not at all intimate why atheists, agnostics, and theists should evaluate the two 
arguments differently. Do theists infer metaphysical possibility in the ‘for’ argument, but 
epistemic possibility in the ‘against’ argument, and atheists vice-versa? This is at best 
unmotivated, and it is at worst absurd. Even more absurd is how such a hypothesis – if true – 
ought to explain the found pattern of analysis ratings. 
 In this way, the empirical results are robust. There are possible issues of interpretation 
since arguments must be interpreted, but merely flagging these does not constitute a successful 
objection. That requires further explanation of how some difference in the arguments plausibly 
	
leads to interpretations upon which religious beliefs do and ought to affect ratings of strength and 
validity. I see nothing close to a plausible explanation of this kind. 
 For the reader who is still not convinced that the arguments are of equal strength and 
validity, there is one final response. For this reader, the experimental challenge shifts from one 
aimed at atheists and theists alike to one directed at either atheists or theists (and also agnostics). 
If, for instance, one insists that the most plausible interpretation of the ‘for’ argument is one in 
which it is valid and strong but the most plausible interpretation of the ‘against’ argument is one 
in which it is invalid and weak, there is still a challenge directed at atheists; why have atheists’ 
religious beliefs interfered with purportedly objective argument analysis? In this case, there is 
also a challenge to agnostics; why have their agnostic religious beliefs affected argument 
analysis in which one argument should be rated as better than the other? For a reader who insists 
the opposite (that the ‘for’ argument is invalid and weak and the ‘against’ is valid and strong), 
there is still a challenge to theists and agnostics. Why, if the ‘for’ argument is invalid and weak 
and the ‘against’ valid and strong, have theists and agnostics expressed analyses in which the 
‘for’ argument is rated as better or roughly equal to the ‘against’?  
 I argued previously that the experimental results are robust. Additionally, the 
experimental challenge is robust. An objection that one argument (‘for’ or ‘against’) is better 
than another does not evaporate the challenge from the effect of religious belief; it merely 
relocates it since atheists, agnostics, and theists provided different argument analyses. The results 
demonstrate an effect of religious (atheistic, agnostic, or theistic) belief on argument analysis. 
Claiming one argument is better than the other might save one group from empirical challenge. 
For instance, if the ‘for’ argument is stronger, this provides comfort to theists. But it is then even 
more troubling that atheists and agnostics evaluate the arguments in the empirically uncovered 
	
fashion.  
 Before turning to the next section it is worth dispelling a possible false conclusion some 
might draw from the interpretation I favor. There is a clear empirical challenge to atheists and/or 
theists, but what about the agnostics? Their strength ratings were roughly equivalent for the ‘for’ 
and ‘against’ arguments, so it might seem they are immune from the effect of religious belief. 
On the interpretation I argued for previously, the ‘for’ and ‘against’ arguments are of 
comparable quality and should be rated equivalently. On this interpretation, there are two 
possible explanations of the agnostics’ results. On the positive view, the results suggest agnostics 
were not affected by their personal (agnostic) religious beliefs. But there is a negative view 
available. Imagine what we would expect if the agnostics’ religious beliefs were to influence 
their ratings of these arguments. The most likely expectation is that this would encourage them to 
rate arguments for or against a theistic conclusion overly moderately. Where religious belief 
encourages theists to over-endorse theistic arguments and atheists to over-endorse atheistic 
arguments, might it most likely encourage agnostics to provide overly moderate evaluations of 
both atheistic and theistic natural theological arguments?  
On my view, in which the arguments here are comparable, we do not have the evidence 
to distinguish between the positive and negative view of the agnostics’ ratings. Perhaps their 
equivalent ratings were driven by cool rational analysis. Or perhaps their equivalent ratings were 
driven by a pernicious equalizing effect of agnostic religious commitments. The experiment was 
not designed to distinguish between these possibilities. We must remain agnostic. 
 
5. From Magisterial to Ministerial Reason 
 Recall from the first section that my targets are natural theological arguments whose 
	
conclusions purportedly have real epistemic weight. These arguments, if sound and valid, 
provide evidence, justification, or even proof of God’s existence. This is a frequent 
contemporary interpretation of natural theological arguments, including the ontological argument 
(e.g. Lowe, 2007; Maydole, 2009). This corresponds roughly to Craig’s magisterial use of 
reason; ‘reason stands over and above the gospel like a magistrate and judges it on the basis of 
argument and evidence’ (Craig, 2008). 
But this is not the only available interpretation of natural theological arguments. In fact, 
there is a competing interpretation of the role of reason in natural theology. On the ministerial 
interpretation, ‘reason submits to and serves the gospel ... Reason is a tool to help us better 
understand and defend our faith’ (Craig, 2008). This flavor of interpretation of rationalist 
argument can be traced to at least St. Augustine, and can also be found in contemporary 
philosophy of religion.16  
Oppy characterizes ontological arguments as those proceeding from considerations 
‘entirely internal to the theistic worldview’ (Oppy, 1995, 1). Notably, many hold Anselm’s 
original ontological argument invoked something close to this kind of reasoning. Plantinga’s 
modal ontological argument is also not meant as a proof of God’s existence. Plantinga writes of 
the arguments: ‘since it is rational to accept their central premise, they do show that it is rational 
to accept that conclusion’ (Plantinga, 1974, 221). This again suggests that something like 
ministerial (rather than magisterial) reasoning is at work. 
If we assume reason plays a ministerial role in natural theological arguments, the 
empirical results appear less troubling. On this interpretation, that religious belief influences 
philosophical argument analysis is not a distorting effect, but rather a relevant expression of 																																																								
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one’s own internal commitments. What is more troubling, however, is if natural theologians and 
philosophers of religion pass off ministerial reasoning as magisterial reasoning. This constitutes 
an inappropriate inference from one’s internal perspective to a conclusion in the realm of 
magisterial reason. I am sympathetic to those who claim the empirical results reflect something 
like a use of ministerial reason, but (if so) we must also acknowledge that such natural 
theological arguments do not support magisterial conclusions. 
The thought that ministerial reasoning explains the found results could be expressed in a 
number of ways. Another possible interpretation of the empirical results in this line is that they 
are a product of the participants’ relevant differing initial background beliefs or priors. If, before 
approaching either modal argument, my credence in God’s existence is great, I should assign 
greater credence to the premise of the ‘for’ argument than the premise of the ‘against’ argument. 
Perhaps, even, for this reason I should rate the former argument as stronger than the latter. 
I am initially sympathetic to this kind of interpretation, though it is mysterious how such 
an interpretation should explain the found effect of religious belief on the arguments’ logical 
validity. Furthermore, the costs of such an interpretation are not trivial. If seemingly independent 
analyses of natural theological arguments’ strength or validity are (rightly) influenced by prior 
religious beliefs, this entails a different conception of the methodology of natural theology than 
is typically assumed. On this revised view, when a theist criticizes the argument from evil or the 
argument from poor design, his background beliefs for God’s existence (supported, perhaps, by 
the cosmological argument or argument from miracles or a sensus divinitatis) are relevant to the 
present analysis of a different argument. 
In the same way, a consequentialist might be impressed by argument X for 
consequentialism – if he is a consequentialist there probably is some argument that impressed 
	
him along the way. But when he is asked to evaluate argument Y, also for consequentialism, the 
fact that argument X is impressive just should not be relevant to his analysis, which is an analysis 
not of consequentialism, but of argument Y. Furthermore, if it were relevant then we should 
expect consequentialists and nonconsequentialists to have sharply different evaluations of any 
ethical argument involving consequentialism. But consequentialists can and should recognize 
bad arguments for consequentialism, as nonconsequentialists can and should recognize good 
ones. 
The same is true of philosophy of religion. Background beliefs, priors, or religious 
convictions could be relevant when asked generally, ‘does God exist?’ But it is delusive to offer 
these as a justification for supposedly independent analyses not of general claims of God’s 
existence, but rather of particular magisterial arguments. The question here was not ‘does God 
exist?’ Rather, the questions were about this argument: how strong is this argument and is it 
logically valid?  
There is a final problem with claiming that background beliefs or priors are relevant to 
analysis of these arguments. The method of philosophy of religion is presumably one in which 
analysis of propositions and arguments can proceed independently of one’s religious affiliation 
and can be shared between two philosophers despite differences in their background beliefs. If 
two philosophers of religion disagree about the strength or validity of argument X, we typically 
do not think that in order to resolve this dispute we should inquire about their other religious 
beliefs. When two philosophers of religion disagree about the validity of an argument, it does not 
seem that to resolve this dispute we should have to look to such background beliefs. Perhaps 
some readers will think that this is just how we should proceed. This would result in an 
interesting philosophical method, but also one fraught with the need for disclosure of many 
	
personal beliefs.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 It is worth recalling that the results and arguments presented here are not anti-theistic or 
anti-atheistic; this is a challenge from the effect of religious belief (theistic or atheistic and 
perhaps also agnostic) to certain rationalist projects in natural theology. Furthermore, the results 
do not necessarily support a claim that religious belief has a pernicious effect on argument 
analysis. If philosophers and theologians employ ministerial reasoning, we should expect such 
effects and should not be deeply troubled by them – so long as philosophers and theologians do 
not pass off this ministerial reasoning as magisterial. 
If, however, philosophers of religion and theologians have grander aims, employing 
magisterial reason and seeking to provide independent and objective evidence or justification for 
claims of God’s existence, then we have more reason for concern. In this latter case, personal 
religious beliefs and commitments should not influence analysis of rationalist arguments in 
natural theology. This leaves philosophers of religion and theologians with a choice about such 
arguments: reevaluate the role of reason and the scope of conclusions or acknowledge and begin 
to address the influence of religious belief. 
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